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ABSTRACT 
 
What factors lead to greater levels of generalized trust in society? The research field has established  
four channels through which it is commonly argued trust is affected at the macro level—economic 
inequality, civic participation, ethnic heterogeneity, and institutional quality.   However, the quanti-
tative field has focused overwhelmingly at the national level of analysis, mostly ignoring sub-
national variation in trust, or focusing on single countries. We fill that gap in this study, which of-
fers the largest and most comprehensive sub-national assessment of this salient question to date, 
including 206 regions in 24 European countries using data from an original survey of over 85,000 
respondents conducted in 2013. Upon mapping national and regional levels of social trust based on 
our novel data, we find strong variation in levels of generalized trust within many countries, a phe-
nomenon that has been often overlooked by national-level studies. We use a number of statistical 
estimations to assess the strength of the four channels through which trust can be enhanced or 
eroded. We find strong and robust evidence that institutional quality—measured as a public sector 
that allocates services impartially and without corruption—is the strongest determinant of regional 
variations in trust within countries, while economic inequality, civic participation and ethnic hetero-
geneity are not significant factors in explaining variations in trust patterns. 
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Introduction 
How do quality public institutions impact generalized trust?  Since the publication of Rob-
ert Putnam’s “modern classic” Making Democracy Work in 1993 which analysed the poli-
tics of regions within Italy, the issue of social capital has become a huge research industry. 
Defined as a combination of interpersonal generalized (a.k.a. social) trust and networks 
based on reciprocity, social capital is now generally recognized as major asset for groups 
and societies (Castiglione et al. 2008; Svendsen and Svendsen 2009). The reason for the 
strong interest is that, as measured in surveys, social trust correlates with a number of oth-
er variables that for most people are normatively highly desirable. At the individual level, 
people who believe that most other people in their society in general can be trusted, are 
also more inclined to have a positive view of their democratic institutions, participate 
more in politics and be more active in civic organizations, and are more tolerant towards 
minorities and to people who are not like themselves. Trusting people also have a more 
optimistic view of their possibilities to have an influence over their own life-chances and, 
not least important, to be more happy with how their life is going (Leung et al. 2011; Hel-
liwell 2006; Dinesen 2013; Delhey and Newton 2005; Uslaner 2002).   
The same positive pattern exists at the societal level.  Cities, regions and countries with 
more trusting people are likely to have better working democratic institutions, more open 
economies, greater economic growth and less crime and corruption (Bjørnskov 2009; 
Keefer and Knack 2005; Richey 2010; Uslaner 2008).  Both at the individual and societal 
level, many things that are normatively desirable seem connected to social trust and social 
capital. What has also made the issue of social trust is that it varies widely both - as Put-
nam (1993) showed - within as well as across states.  At the country level, scholars have 
consistently found striking gap in aggregate trust levels.  For example, in Norway, Den-
mark and the Netherlands, a clear majority state that they believe most other people can 
be trusted, while in Brazil, the Philippines and Turkey, only around 10 percent think so 
(Rothstein and Uslaner 2005).   
As for the interpretation of what the standard survey question about social trust actually 
measures, we support the idea launched by Uslaner (2002) who argues that when people 
answer if they think that “most other people can be trusted”, this can be understood as 
their evaluation of the moral standard of the society in which they live. This implies that 
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trust can be seen as an informal institution as argued by North (1998) and therefore as 
source of social cohesion and collaboration  creating a system of beliefs that the various 
groups in society have a shared responsibility and ability to provide public and merit goods 
(Uslaner, 2002, chap. 7). 
That generalized trust is beneficial for a society is thus clear – yet what factors lead to 
higher levels of trust?  A recent surge of scholarship on the determinants of trust has es-
tablished a ‘horserace’ of sorts at two levels of analysis.  Among societal explanations that 
have gained theoretical and empirical traction are civic participation (Putnam 1993; Paxton 
2007), ethnic diversity (Hooghe et al 2009; Putnam 2007; Schaeffer 2013), inequality 
(Uslaner 2002; Rohstein and Uslaner 2005) and quality and impartial political institutions 
(known as ‘QoG’ in this paper, Rothstein 2008; Rothstein and Eek 2009; Freitag and 
Buhlmann 2009).  At the individual level, factors such as age, socio-economic status, gen-
der, and ethno-linguistic background, and civic activity have been found to play a role in 
trust levels to varying degrees.  
Building on such previous analyses, this study makes several noteworthy contributions to 
our understanding of generalized trust.  First, while comparative empirical research on 
trust has blossomed in recent years at the country and/or individual levels, little is known 
about how much trust varies within countries, at the sub-national level. While several anal-
yses investigate trust patters at the regional or municipal level in a single country (Putnam 
1993; Putnam 2007; Alesina and La Ferrara 1999; Letki 2008), a multi-country context has 
gone un-investigated.  We address this gap by using original data collected by the authors 
for both generalized trust and institutional quality based on a survey of more than 85,000 
respondents in 189 regions in 25 European countries.1  Combining this survey data with 
regional register data give us unique possibilities for analyzing the effects of institutions 
versus several other competing explanations of social trust. Moreover, Europe offers an 
excellent test case due to remarkable variation in trust at the national level (Hooghe et al 
2009), yet with our new combination of survey and register data, we show significant vari-
ations in trust at the sub-national level in several countries including Italy, Germany, Bel-
gium, Spain and France, demonstrating that inferences at the regional level are more pre-
cise relative to national-level comparisons. Moreover, sub-national, between-country com-
                                                     
1
 Funding for this research comes in part from the European Commission’s Seventh Annul Framework.   
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parisons provide many advantages, as they increase the number of observations, provide 
inherent ‘natural controls’, and strengthen causal inferences (Snyder 2001).  The results 
show that compared with several competing factors, the effect of institutional setting 
(quality of government, henceforth ‘QoG’) is the strongest and most robust predictor of 
regional trust levels throughout Europe.    
Second, the extent to which individual-level patterns of trust are conditioned by macro-
level factors is relatively under-researched.  For example, is a gender, education or age gap 
in trust present in all countries? While some cross-level interactions have been explored 
(Freitag and Buhlmann 2009), we know very little about how individual levels of trust are 
conditioned by macro contexts, such as institutional setting.  We investigate these two 
relatively unexplored areas in the field of trust research here. 
Before proceeding with our analyses, we present a relevant literature on factors that lead to 
trust and outline our contribution.   Next, we present novel data, which constitutes to our 
knowledge the most comprehensive to date on social trust and QoG at the regional level 
in Europe; testing the relationship between several leading factors and trust at the sub-
national level.  In sum, we find that QoG is far and away the strongest predictor of re-
gional variations in generalized trust and that the negative effects of social inequality and 
ethnic diversity on social trust become negligible when we control for the level QoG. 
Third, using multi-level modeling, we test cross-level interactions between the regional-
level QoG and individual level factors, such as demographic characteristics and attitudes 
and experience with corruption.  Among several noteworthy findings, we demonstrate that 
while in low QoG settings a significant gender and age gap in trust exists, this gap disap-
pears in high QoG areas.  Trust gaps are also found in high QoG regions between high 
and low income earners, people of different education levels as well as the employed vers-
es unemployed, yet none of these gaps are found in low QoG settings (most all respond-
ents display relatively low levels of trust). We also find that experiences with corruption 
erode trust much more in high QoG settings than in low QoG ones.  We conclude with a 
discussion and suggestions for future research.  
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What creates and what destroys social trust?  
While the positive effects of high levels of social trust has become generally accepted, sev-
eral factors relating to how it is in fact generated have recently been much debated and 
controversial. The first is the question about the importance of civil society and voluntary 
associations for generating social trust. Putnam’s studies emphasized that by being active 
in voluntary associations, citizens would learn to develop social trust and understand the 
importance of positive reciprocity (Putnam 1993).  In this society-centered “Tocquevilli-
an” approach, the capacity of a society to produce social capital and social trust   is seen as 
being determined by citizens’ activity in voluntary associations (Stolle 2003),. However, a 
large number of studies carried out over the last decades have called into question the ef-
fect of participation in voluntary associations for social trust. While it is true that people 
who are “joiners” also generally trust others more, this seems to be an effect of self-
selection. People who—for some other reason—score high on the social ability to trust 
and cooperate with others join voluntary associations disproportionately. However, activi-
ty in such organizations does not increase the individuals’ social trust. Members become 
purely more trusting of their fellow members and they cooperate more for group purposes 
only (Stolle 2003; Uslaner 2002). Thus the evidence that associational membership of 
adults creates social capital has not survived empirical testing (Armony 2004; Delhey and 
Newton 2003; Dinesen 2013; Claiborn and Martin 2000; Herreros 2004; Robbins 2011; 
Wollebæck and Selle 2003). To take one example, one large-scale empirical study aiming at 
explaining variations in social trust based on the World Values Study surveys and covering 
no less than sixty countries concludes that “perhaps most important and most surprising, 
none of the four measures of voluntary activity stood up to statistical tests, in spite of the 
importance attached to them in a large body of writing, from de Tocqueville onwards” 
(Delhey and Newton 2004, 27).  
A second major issue in the social trust and social capital literature has to do with ethnic 
diversity. The initial positive view of the many good effects of social trust has been tam-
pered by findings showing that societies with a high ethnic diversity tend to have lower 
social trust (Schaeffer 2013). The logic behind this argument is fairly straightforward. Peo-
ple trust other people “in general” that they perceive as ethnically their equals but they 
distrust people whom they perceive as ethnically different. Some economic studies claim 
that ethnic diversity, through its negative effects on social trust and social cohesion, ex-
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plains why many poor countries fail to produce the amount of public goods necessary for 
social and economic development (Easterly and Levine 1997; Habyarimana et al. 2007).  
Putnam (2007) and Alesina and La Ferrara (1999) have also reported evidence of this rela-
tionship at the sub-national level for the U.S.  Others have claimed that the increasing 
ethnic diversity in Western Europe will make redistribution to various welfare state pro-
grams more difficult (Alesina et al. 2001; Eger 2010). This argument has not gone without 
criticism and several studies have pointed out that ethnic diversity does not necessarily or 
only under certain specific conditions destroy social trust (Uslaner 2012; Kumlin and 
Rothstein 2010; Gesthuizen et al. 2009). In a recent overview of this research, including no 
less than 480 empirical findings from 172 studies, Schaeffer (2013) convincingly shows 
that many studies about this controversial issue come to different conclusions. This incon-
clusiveness is according to him due to variation in research design such as which region of 
the world that is analyzed, which type of ethnic diversity that is scrutinized and also what 
type of measure is used for the dependent variable.  Schaeffer points out that while there 
is a slight overweight for the confirmatory studies, discipline matters a lot. Many more 
studies in economics journals confirm the negative effect of ethnic diversity on social trust 
than studies published in political science or sociology journals. However, he also shows 
that for the 58 studies that have generalized trust as the dependent analysis, there is close 
to a draw: 30 empirical results refute and 28 corroborate the hypothesis (Schaeffer 
2013:12). Moreover, in a European context, recent empirical work has called into question 
this relationship (Hooghe et al 2009).   
A third major issue in this research has to do with the effect of structural and institutional 
contra individual variables (Uslaner 2002). What is the effect on individuals’ propensity for 
social trust for variables such as gender, age, political attitudes and being unemployed 
compared to institutional or societal variables such as the quality of government institu-
tions, ethnic diversity and the overall prosperity and economic inequality of the society in 
which he or she lives. Economic inequality has been put forward by Uslaner (2002) as 
particularly detrimental to social trust.   
Finally, the approach highlighted in this study is institution-centered.  In response to the 
failure of the society-centered approach to produce good empirical indicators for its claims 
about how the causal mechanisms generating social trust operates, the institution-centered 
accounts of social capital theory claim that for social trust to flourish it needs to be em-
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bedded in and linked to the political context as well as formal political and legal institu-
tions (Berman 1997; Encarnación 2003; Robbins 2011; Rothstein and Uslaner 2005; Roth-
stein and Eek 2009; Kumlin and Rothstein 2010; You 2012; Villoria et al. 2013; Richey 
2010). According to this group of scholars, who base their research largely on historical 
case studies, experiments or large-n survey data (or all three),  it is trustworthy, uncorrupt, 
honest, impartial government institutions that exercise public power and implement public 
policies in a fair manner that create social trust and social capital. For example, Delhey and 
Newton concluded from their above mentioned study that “government, especially cor-
ruption free and democratic government, seems to set a structure in which individuals are 
able to act in a trustworthy manner and not suffer, and in which they can reasonably ex-
pect that most others will generally do the same” (2004, 28). Using survey data from 29 
European countries, Bjørnskov (2004) concluded that a high level of social trust is strong-
ly correlated with a low level of corruption. Another study, also based on comparative 
survey data, concludes that “the central contention … is that political institutions that 
support norms of fairness, universality, and the division of power contribute to the for-
mation of inter-personal trust” (Freitag and Buhlmann 2005).  
Using scenario experiments in low trust/high corruption Romania and in high trust/low 
corruption Sweden, Rothstein and Eek (2009) found that persons in both these countries 
who experience corruption among public health care workers or the local police when 
travelling in an “unknown city in and unfamiliar country” do not only loose trust in these 
authorities but also in other people in general that “unknown” society.  Their theory for 
how the causal mechanism between corruption and social trust operates is that since peo-
ple cannot really know if “most people” in their society can be trusted, they have to use 
some kind of short-cuts or heuristics.  The theory is that people make inferences from the 
behavior of their public officials when forming beliefs about to what extent people in gen-
eral in their society can be trusted. Moreover, if local public officials are known to be dis-
honest, corrupt, discriminatory or unfair, many will make a second inference. Namely that 
in order to get by in life in a such with dishonest public officials, ordinary people them-
selves have to become engaged in various forms of dishonest behavior (corruption, nepo-
tism, favoritism) and because of this, they cannot be trusted. In sum, this first issue that 
we want to shed light on is precisely this one: If social trust is generated from “below” by 
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activity in voluntary associations or from “above” by citizens perception of the quality of 
their government institutions.     
Brief description of survey data and design 
To explore these central issues in the research about what may create and destroy social 
trust and social capital, we take advantage of two original data sets based on two recent 
large surveys, organized by the authors (in 2010 and in 2013). The 2010 sample consisted 
of about 34.000 citizen interviews and the more recent survey sampled over 85,000 indi-
viduals. The respondents have been sampled by regions in European countries, in total 
212 so called NUTS 1 and NUTS 2 regions for 25 European countries2.  These surveys 
have  focused on citizen perceptions and experiences of the quality of their regional gov-
ernment institutions (including and experiences as well as perceptions of corruption) and 
have also included questions about social trust (see Charron, Lapuente and Rothstein, 
2010, 2013 and Charron, Dijkstra and Lapuente 2014).  With over 400 observations per 
region, the latest round of these surveys constitutes the largest and most comprehensive 
regional mapping of the quality of government (henceforth QoG) and social trust to date. 
The data thus constitutes a unique empirical resource for this type of research and repre-
sents a noteworthy improvement over past empirical studies that investigate sub-national 
trust levels which employed data from the World Value Survey or European Values Sur-
veys, and had significantly fewer observations per region (Akcomak and Ter Weel 2009; 
Tabellini 2010; Van Schaik 2002).  
Using this data, we analyze variations in patterns of trust at two levels in this paper.  First, 
we show that social trust varies significantly not only between countries, but also within 
them, and that this variation in many cases is geographically in line with politi-
cal/administrative sub-national boundaries.  Country-level analyses overlook this variation 
and thus underestimate (or overestimate) social trust in higher (or lower) trust regions.  As 
we show below, this “regional lens” gives important analytical leverage since many of the 
standard country variables can be controlled for ‘naturally’. To account for this spatial 
variation in trust at the sub-national level, following the three main issues related above, 
we test a number of theoretical propositions about what explains variation in levels of 
                                                     
2
 NUTS refer to ‘Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics’, and are EU statistical regions, for more information, see: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/nuts_nomenclature/introduction  
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social trust. These range from the quality of government (QoG), economic inequality, civic 
participation, ethnic heterogeneity, and the extent to which the political environment is 
fractionalized.   
Second, using multi-level modeling, we explore cross-level interactions - how the regional 
context conditions individual levels of trust.  As mentioned above, several studies have 
shown that individual level factors, such as gender, income, ethnic-linguistic origin, age, 
etc. drive levels of social trust among citizens within countries.  In addition, we also expect 
that the impact of individual-level perceptions and experiences with corruption on social 
trust is conditioned by the regional QoG context.  Our argument is that – given that per-
ceptions of QoG is strongly associated with impartiality in the implementation of laws and 
public policies, low corruption and general sense of fairness in the civil service, the indi-
vidual  differences in trust among citizens (such as gender or age) should not matter in 
regions with a high level of QoG. We expect, however, that in low QoG regions, differ-
ences in social trust will be driven by factors of ‘achievement’, broadly speaking, (such as 
income or education).  
Measuring the Variation of Social Trust by Country and Re-
gion 
To capture social trust, we take advantage of the latest round of a regional governance 
survey (2013) (for the 2010 round see Charron, Dijkstra and Lapuente 2014; Charron, 
Lapuente and Rothstein 2013)3. Each region in our study has between 400-450 respond-
ents (more on regions in subsequent sections).  The trust question is asked in the standard 
format from previous studies, such as the European Values Survey, and World Values 
Survey4.   
At the individual level, a respondent is coded as ‘1’ if they answer “Most people can be 
trusted” and ‘0’ if “Can’t be too careful”.  At the regional level, we take the proportion of 
respondents who answered “Most people can be trusted” over those who answered “Can’t 
be too careful”, such that aggregate responses over 0.5 imply that the majority in that re-
                                                     
3
 A more thorough description of the latest round of the survey can be found in Appendix B. 
4
 “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with 
people in your area?”: 1 “Most people can be trusted”, or 2 “Can’t be too careful”.   
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gion believe that most people can be trusted; while less than 0.5 constitutes that a majority 
believes that one ‘can’t be too careful’.  The measure is thus continuous, and bound be-
tween 0-1.   
Figure 1 highlights the distribution of social trust by country level5 and regional variation 
around each country estimate. We observe that social trust varies remarkably across as well 
as within European states. Moreover, while national level contexts do matter to a great 
deal, as shown by the consistent clustering of regions around countries, the differences 
between regions in many countries are noteworthy and demonstrate clear limits of national 
level analyses.  
First, while the mean for the whole sample is 0.42, we find noteworthy national level varia-
tion.  While Scandinavian states display high trust, several EU member state countries like 
France and Poland display surprisingly low levels6.  At first glance, social trust might ap-
pear to be determined by geography or history (e.g. West vs. East Europe for example), 
yet we observe that countries like France, Greece, Portugal and Belgium have a majority of 
respondents under 0.5 (e.g. the dashed-line in Figure 1).  At the country level, the vast 
majority of respondents in Sweden and Denmark, and also UK, Finland, Austria, Ireland 
and Netherlands say that they ‘trust others’, yet social trust is extremely low in many other 
European states.  For example, in Hungary, Greece, Bulgaria and most regions in France, 
less than 30% of the citizens there say they can ‘trust others’, while in Czech Republic, 
Slovakia and Serbia, the number drops below 20%.  These findings are consistent with 
recent empirical analyses7 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
5
 Country levels calculated as a population weighted average of the regional level scores for each country. 
6
 In the case of these two countries, it is very unlikely that that we find such low levels of trust due to a small sample size 
of respondents.  The number of individual observations for France and Poland is 10,409 and 6,400 respectively.   
7
 For example, two recent studies employ a European, or largely European sample (Hooghe et al 2009 and Freitag and 
Buhlmann 2009).  The Spearman rank coefficient between our common countries and theirs is 0.85 and 0.86 respec-
tively  
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FIGURE 1, SOCIAL TRUST IN 22 EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND REGIONAL VARIATION 
 
Note: Y-axis is the aggregate proportion of respondents who ‘trust others’.  Country abbreviations: SE (Sweden), DK (Den-
mark), UK (United Kingdom), FI (Finland), AT (Austria), IE (Ireland), NL (Netherlands), IT (Italy), DE (Germany), 
ES (Spain), RO (Romania), PT (Portugal), BE (Belgium), HR (Croatia), PL (Poland), BG (Bulgaria), GR (Greece), FR 
(France), HU (Hungary), CZ (Czech Rep.), SK (Slovakia), RS (Serbia). 
 
Second, and more of interest to this study, the regional-level variation across Europe is 
striking, ranging from 0.08 (Východné Slovensko region in Slovakia) to 0.80 (Copenhagen 
region, Denmark).  Moreover, several countries, such as Italy, Spain, Germany, Austria, 
France and Belgium, have noteworthy sub-national variation in social trust.  In the case of 
Germany, the region with the highest level of social trust, Schleswig-Holstein, is among 
the top 10% in our full sample of regions, with a vast majority of respondents claiming 
that they can ‘trust others’. Saarland, a region close to France, is far below the sample av-
erage with less than 34% of respondents claiming that they can trust others.  We find a 
similar gap in Italy, with Friuli V.G. and Bolzano in the very north showing quite high 
levels of social trust, while Campania in the very south stands out as relatively low.  In 
both cases, Germany and Italy have regions that have the same levels of social trust or 
higher as Finland, Austria or the UK, while several regions in these same countries have 
lower social trust than several regions in Portugal, Romania, Spain, Belgium or Poland – 
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all countries with noticeably lower levels of trust at the aggregate national level.  Spain and 
Belgium also have noteworthy variation, with social trust in Flanders almost twice as high 
as that in Wallonia. For Spain, the majority in the Pais Vasco region ‘trusts others’ (54%), 
while less than 38% do so in the Canarias or Murcia regions.  These findings are generally 
consistent with previous studies that have explored social trust at the regional level in Eu-
rope (Tabellini 2010; Van Schaik 2002) and correlate rather strongly with the most recent 
round of the European Value Survey at the NUTS 2 level8.  However, we would argue 
that the data here is more reliable relative to regional data used in previous studies, as the 
sample size per region is more than twice what it would be if European Value Survey or 
World Value Survey data were employed9.  It also has the advantage of all countries having 
data points from the same year, as opposed to survey data scattered in rounds of two to 
three year periods.   
Regional Level Differences in Trust: Explanatory Variables 
and Methods 
In this section, we model statistically several leading explanations of social trust as dis-
cussed in section 2.  While register and survey data at the sub-national level is growing in 
relevance among scholars, it still cannot compare in terms of scope and availability to na-
tional level register and survey data, thus we are somewhat limited in our selection of indi-
cators.   
Primary Independent variables  
a. Public Sector Institutions. For this variable (QoG), we use the 2010 regional score for 
the European Quality of Government Index (EQI, Charron, Dijkstra and Lapuente 2014), 
which is an advantage because it precedes the dependent variable temporally.  The meas-
ure captures the extent to which regional public services are impartial, of high quality and a 
clean from corruption, based on both experiences as well as perceptions from our re-
                                                     
8
 For purposes of external validity, we gathered trust data in the latest round of the EVS (2008), which uses the exact 
same question, and compared all available regions in common with our sample.  We find that among the 182 regions 
we have in common, the Spearman rank coefficient is 0.58.  Yet many regions in the EVS data have insufficient obser-
vations (less than 100), and thus when comparing only regions in the EVS that have at least 100 observations (117 
total), the Spearman rank coefficient increases to 0.70.  When comparing regions in common with at least 200 observa-
tions in the EVS, the Spearman rank increases to 0.79 (68 total regions), showing that the estimates begin to converge 
as the sample size increases, which demonstrates evidence of external validity of our measure.  
9
 Using EVS data instead of ours for the 189 regions in common with our study would result in about 40000 less individ-
ual observations (31368 compared with 72800) or an average regional N of 175 compared with 410.   
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spondents.  To maximize regional variation, the data focuses on services primarily admin-
istered or financed by sub-national actors, such as education, health services and law en-
forcement. The survey also included questions about the extent to which regional elections 
are perceived as being free from corruption and the level of perceived political impartiality 
in the regional mass media.  From this we have created an index on whole as well as sever-
al of the sub-components, such as impartiality and corruption.     
b. Inequality.  With no ‘perfect’ regional measure available, and much less to choose from 
than compared to the national level of analysis, we elect capture inequality in two ways.  
First, we take a measure of economic inequality.  We take the Gini index of wage inequali-
ty from Galbraith and Garcilazo (2005), which captures the pay inequalities of manufac-
turing wages by region, averaged from 1995-2000.  The score ranges from ‘0’ to ‘1’ (per-
fect equality to perfect inequality) Second; we capture gender inequality in the labor mar-
ket.  Taken from Eurostat (2011), we take the male to female ratio of unemployment for 
each region.  A ‘0’ implies there are no differences, while higher scores imply that a greater 
proportion of females are unemployed relative to men.   
c. Voluntary civic participation and social networks. We capture this with two measures.  
First, is the voter turnout in regional parliamentary elections, averaged for all available 
electoral data from 1990-2010.  Since these are not national elections, they give an even 
better sense of how much ‘civic engagement’ can vary from region to region as well as 
how engaged citizens are in their local politics.   
Second, we take survey data from the latest round of the European Value Survey (EVS, 
2008).  We combine six relevant questions of voluntary civic participation into one index10. 
We take the aggregate proportion of ‘yes’ respondents for each of the 6 activities and, after 
obtaining weights from a principle component factor analysis (PCF), we combine the 6 
into a single index (‘civic index’) for each region11.  The index ranges from 0 (no participa-
tion) to ‘1’ (full participation in all activities).  A full description of how the index was 
built, the weights, etc. can be found in the appendix.    
                                                     
10
 Which, if any, do you belong to? A) Political parties or groups B). Religious or church organizations C). Education, 
arts, music or cultural activities D) Sports or recreation E) Local community action on issues like poverty, employment, 
housing, racial equality F). Other groups 
11
 The PCF showed all 6 components clustered strongly onto one factor (according to the Kaiser criteria), as there was 
only one factor with an Eigenvalue over ‘1’ and it explained over 60% of the total variation.  
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d. Ethno-Linguistic Diversity.  While most data on heterogeneity of the population is 
available only at the national level, the extent to which regions are ethnically homogenous/ 
heterogeneous is captured with two measures.  First, we take the measure of regional eth-
nic diversity from Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011), whereby we take the percentage which 
consists of the main ethnic group for each region.  Because this is not available for all re-
gions, we employ an alternative measure from Eurostat, which is the percentage of each 
region’s population born outside of the E.U.    
We also include several other structural factors elucidated by the literature.  We measure 
this by the extent to which politics in a region is polarized and/or competitive.  From re-
gional elections data12, we calculate several measure of elite, political competition.  First, 
we capture the extent to which regional parliamentary elections are competitive, based on 
a common measure from the literature on party competition – the vote percent difference 
between the two largest parties in a given election (Jackman 1987)13.  Second, we create a 
regional measure of party fractionalization.  This is calculated using a Herfindal index, 
which essentially elucidates the likelihood of randomly drawing out two members of par-
liament (MP) of the same political party, with scores ranging from ‘0’ to ‘1’.  Scores of ‘0’ 
imply that all MP’s are of their own party, while a score of ‘1’ implies that al MP’s belong 
to the same party, thus we take 1-Herfindal to render higher numbers equaling more frac-
tionalization.   
Finally, we control for the level of economic development is captured by taking the aver-
age logged GDP per capita income (averaged) from 2007-2009 (Eurostat).  We also con-
trol for whether or not a region is a capital region as well as regional size, both in terms of 
population and area, with a measure of population density (Eurostat) from 2010, logged.  
Further, since several of the countries are federal, or semi federal with some regions hav-
ing asymmetrical powers relative to others (e.g. Pais Vasco in Spain, Sicily or Bolzano in 
Italy for example) we control for whether the region is autonomous (0/1). 
With respect to our sample and methods, as stated, our sample is derived from a recent 
survey of over 85,000 individuals in 212 so called NUTS 1 and NUTS 2 regions for 25 
                                                     
12
 Data taken from: http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/  
13
 In the case of some regions, primarily in Italy where parties announce prior to Election Day other parties with whom 
they will form a coalition, we take the difference between the two largest pre-election coalition blocs.   
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European countries14.  Due to data limitations at the regional level, countries like Ukraine, 
Turkey and Serbia are dropped from most models.  For models testing QoG, inequality 
(gender), and diversity, we have up to 189 regions from 21 countries. Data on wage ine-
quality, and civic engagement is more limited, and thus several countries drop out reducing 
the number of regions in these models.  
Moreover, when testing the variables of political fractionalization and competitiveness 
along with civic engagement, we have data for only ‘politically relevant regions’,  (with 
popularly elected legislatures and/or executives at the sub-national level for which we have 
a measure of social trust ) which drops the number to 116 regions at the politically signif i-
cant NUTS 1 and NUTS 2 level.  ‘Politically relevant regions’ are coded as all regions in 
Italy, Germany, Spain, Denmark, Belgium, Poland, France, Austria and three regions from 
the UK – Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.   
Regional Level Analysis: Results  
The data is spatial and the dependent variable is continuous and OLS estimation is em-
ployed.  To attempt to address issues of endogeneity/ reverse causality, we take all inde-
pendent variables temporally prior to our measurement of TRUST15.  Diagnostic checks 
show that in many cases, the data is heterogeneous – in particular with several of the key 
variables, such as QoG or inequality – with much more variation in the dependent variable 
at low levels of the key explanatory factors than at high levels.  This can of course be driv-
en by sub-population differences (e.g. countries) and thus we control for country fixed 
effects.  Yet in several models, a Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedastic-
ity16 shows that problems associated with heteroskadasticity remain.  For reasons of effi-
ciency, we run models using Huber White robust standard errors, which relaxes the as-
sumption that the errors are independent and/or identically distributed. Table 1 below 
shows the regional level estimations.      
 
                                                     
14
 A full list of regions in the sample is in Appendix A.  NUTS refer to ‘Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics’, and 
are EU statistical regions, for more information, see: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/nuts_nomenclature/introduction 
15
 See the appendix for the dates of measurement for each variable. 
16
 STATA post-estimation command ‘estat hettest’  
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TABLE 1, THE IMPACT OF REGIONAL LEVEL QOG ON LEVELS OF SOCIAL TRUST 
Dep Var = TRUST, 2013 Baseline Baseline Civ. Eng. Civ. Eng. Inequality Inequality Political Political Diversity Diversity 
I. Regional QoG 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 
EQI (2010) (0.016) (0.008) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.008) (0.01) (0.01) (0.008) (0.01) 
            
II. Civic Engagement 
          
 
Reg. voter turnout 
  
0.001 
       
    
(0.0008) 
       
 
Civic participation index 
 
0.27 
      
     
(0.29) 
      
III. Inequality 
          
 
Wage Ineqality 
    
-0.13 
     
      
(0.19) 
     
            Gender Ineqaulity 
    
-0.001 
    
      
(0.01) 
    
IV. Political Environment 
          
 
Party Fractionlaiztion 
      
0.11 
   
        
(0.07) 
   
 
Competition 
      
-0.002** 
  
         
(0.001) 
  
V. Ethnic Diversity 
          
 
Non-EU born 
        
-0.005 
 
          
(0.01) 
 
 
% non-native 
         
0.001 
           
(0.003) 
Control variables 
          
 
GDP p.c. (logged) 0.11*** 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.12*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.09*** 0.12*** 
  
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
 
Capital -0.02 -0.03** -0.02 -0.002 -0.03* -0.03 0.004 0.01 -0.03* 0.01 
  
(0.04) (0.015) (0.02) (0.02) (0.018) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.017) (0.03) 
 
Pop. Density (logged) 0.0004 -0.0007 -0.01* -0.02** -0.0004 -0.0006 -0.01** -0.02** -0.0005 -0.02** 
  
(0.002) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.0005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.0005) (0.01) 
 
Autonomous 0.09*** 0.018 0.01 0.004 0.01 0.02 0.005 0.02 0.02 0.01 
  
(0.03) (0.013) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.015) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
Constant -0.65*** -0.32 -0.75*** -0.77** -0.09 -0.33 -0.67** -0.62** -0.35 -0.83** 
  
(0.23) (0.24) (0.30) (0.37) (0.33) (0.25) (0.27) (0.32) (0.25) (0.37) 
Obs 
 
189 189 127 95 146 182 116 95 183 91 
Countries 21 21 10 7 14 20 9 7 20 7 
R2 
 
0.35 0.94 0.93 0.90 0.92 0.93 0.92 0.92 0.94 0.89 
Country fixed effects no Yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Note: Robust, Huber White standard errors in parentheses.  Dependent variable is TRUST, and is bound between 0-1, meas-
ured as the proportion of respondents in each region who answered that “Most people can be trusted”.  All models were re-run 
using hierarchical specification allowing for random country-level effects (xtmixed) with no distinguishable differences to report. 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 
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We begin with two baseline models – one with QoG and control variables without coun-
try fixed effects to examine the impact of QoG on trust across all regions throughout our 
European sample, and the second to account for variations of TRUST within countries 17.  
The impact of regional level institutions on variations in TRUST both EU wide and within 
countries is evident – even when taking into account regional wealth, size (density), capital 
region and autonomous status.   
In the models that follow, the QoG hypothesis is tested against measures of civic engage-
ment, inequality, the region’s political environment and diversity.   We find that when ac-
counting for QoG, as well as our controls from models 1 and 2, that although measures of 
civic participation and inequality are in the expected direction, their effects are negligible.  
When testing the effects of the party environment in political relevant regions, we find 
that less competitive regions have lower values of TRUST on average.  For example, the 
marginal decrease in TRUST from a min to max change in Competitiveness, is -0.05 (pre-
dicted level from 0.46 to 0.41) or about an 11% marginal decrease, ceteris paribus.  Aver-
age parliamentary fractionalization is just slightly under the 90% threshold of significance.  
In the final two models, we do not find that ethno-linguistic and/or foreign born hetero-
geneity explains trust patterns within countries. Given the many studies that have shown 
the opposite (using smaller sets of data and usually less precise measures of ethnic diversi-
ty, cf. Schaeffer 2013) this result is noteworthy. In all models however, we find a strikingly 
strong and robust effect of regional QoG.  Consistent with the literature at the national 
level, wealth (GDP p.c.) is a robust, positive indicator of the dependent variable, while in 
several models we find that more densely populated, as well as capital regions exhibit less 
trust, ceteris paribus.  
The impact of QoG on TRUST at the regional level is sizable – a predicted min (0.34) to 
max (0.49) change between two otherwise equal regions constitutes an increase of over 
44%, ceteris paribus.  Finally, post regression checks show no significant outliers when 
comparing actual levels of trust to the model residuals18.   
 
                                                     
17
 The bivariate relationship between regional QoG andTrust can be seen in Figure 2A in Appendix A. 
18
 For model fitness and check for outliers in the model, see figure 1 in the appendix 
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Cross-Level Analysis: Does the Regional Context Affect Indi-
vidual Trust Patterns? 
Aside from explaining aggregate regional variation in trust, QoG at the aggregate level 
might also condition individual level trust patterns.  We test such cross-level interactions 
here.  There is some empirical evidence that individual attitudes of life satisfaction and 
membership in associations are conditioned by structural factors, such as inequality and 
electoral institutions (Freitag and Buhlmann 2009), yet we have little understanding of how 
institutions might impact the composition of individual level trust patterns vis-à-vis demo-
graphic characteristics, such as gender or age.  One of the primary tenets of the QoG liter-
ature is that in high QoG regions/countries, citizens are treated impartially by the gov-
ernment authorities (Rothstein 2011). If trust is seen as an evaluation of the ‘moral stand-
ard of a respondent’s society’, then this should alter gaps in trust from superficial differ-
ences (gender, age, etc.) to more ‘achievement gaps’, such as education, employment and 
income.  In addition, we anticipate that the impact of corruption perceptions and experi-
ences on trust will be conditioned by the institutional context. 
Due to the nature of the data in this section of the analysis, we elect hierarchical modeling, 
which has several advantages, namely being able to test explicitly whether individual level 
trust is conditioned by regional level effects even when controlling for country level varia-
tion; and being able to account for cross-level interactions.  Another clear advantage in the 
multilevel design is that we are able to avoid problems of endogeneity between institutions 
and trust – the models elucidate the probability of two otherwise equal individuals will 
exhibit trust in different institutional environments.   
The hierarchical tests account for several individual level factors that we suspect will relate 
with social trust based on previous empirical literature.  First, we include standard demo-
graphic characteristics, such as gender, age, education level and whether the respondent 
has the mother tongue of the majority in her region.  Second, we take into account the 
political ideology of the respondent on the standard left-right scale (self-placement).  
Third, whether the respondent is unemployed or not is expected to impact trust negative-
ly.  Finally, we take into account whether direct experience and/or general perceptions 
with corruption drive individual level variation in social trust.  Regarding corruption expe-
rience, we code 0/1 whether or not the respondent paid a bribe involving any public ser-
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vice in the past 12 months.  With respect to general perceptions, we take the question ‘In  
your opinion, how often do you believe other people in your area use bribery? (0-10, never 
to very frequently).  All data is taken from the latest round of regional governance survey 
data in 2013 (Charron, Lapuente and Rothstein 2013).   
Methods – Explaining Individual Determinants of Trust in a 
Regional Context  
As individuals are embedded in regions, and regions are embedded in countries, we have 
three distinct levels in our model.  Simply accounting for regional and/or country dummy 
variables for individual level variation in an OLS model can lead to problems, due to the 
fact that the error terms of the lowest level unit (individuals) within the same group will 
still be correlated.  This violates the assumption of independent observations and leads to 
an overestimation of significance of estimates at times (Hox 1995).  OLS models with 
regional or country dummies also assume that the 2nd or 3rd level variables have an equal 
effect on the dependent variable across all individuals, which is not always the case.   
Thus we elect to explain individual levels of trust in a hierarchical Logit model, with three 
levels, ‘i’, ‘j’ and ‘k’ to represent individual, regional and country levels respectively.  The 
basic model used here is: 
Trustijk = β0 + β1xijk + u1jkxijk + Z0k + u0jk + e0ijk 
Where Trustijk is the log of the odds as a function of a set of individual level parameters 
(xijk) plus regional level random effects of the individual parameters (u1jkxijk).  Z0k and 
u0jk are the random level intercepts for the country and regional level respectively, while 
e0ijk is the error term.  In some cases, we test the levels of individual trust in politically 
relevant regions only (with data explained in section 3), thus reducing the number of ob-
servations in the sample.  To maximize the number of observations and for the broadest 
possible generalizability, we then run only QoG and regional controls on individuals in the 
21 countries from section 3. The sample thus somewhat violates the so-called ‘30/30 rule’ 
(which advocates at least 30 cases at each level, (Maas and Hox 2005)), thus we check for 
the effects of outliers in each model.   
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Using this specification, we test directly our hypothesis that differences in TRUST levels 
based on demographic factors will be conditioned on levels of QoG19.  Due to the signifi-
cance of regional variation in many cases for both trust (as we found in section 3) and 
QoG (see for example Charron, Dijkstra and Lapuente 2013), we elect to interact individ-
ual level traits with regional level QoG instead of the national level for more precise infer-
ences.   
Cross-Level Analysis: Results 
Are individual level patterns of trust vis-à-vis certain categories (gender, age, income, etc.) 
different in high versus low QoG settings?  To begin with, the multi-level results (with no 
interaction) demonstrates that the institutional context matters for individual level trust – 
comparing two individuals with otherwise similar demographic characteristics shows the 
probability of TRUST in a high QoG region is 0.45 while in a low QoG regions is 0.40. 
Yet a central question is what happens when individual factors are interacted with the re-
gional QoG environment?  As noted, we would expect that certain differences in social 
trust would be offset in high QoG  settings, that is,  where no one group feels systemati-
cally like they are being treated worse than any other. Therefore, individual demographic 
differences in the dependent variable should be highly conditioned by the regional level of 
QoG in which an individual is embedded. Below we test this notion explicitly20.   
In cases where the individual effects were negative on social trust, such as the coefficient 
for females or foreign-language speaking individuals, for example, we would expect to see 
a positive interaction term with QoG, meaning that differences between men and women, 
or native and second language speakers would be reduced the higher the level of regional 
QoG. This is because we should expect that trust between stereotypically ‘insiders’ (men, 
older citizen, native speakers, etc.) and ‘outsiders’ (women, young people, non-native 
speakers. etc.) would diminish.  With respect to age or education, where the individual 
coefficients are positive (compared with young respondents or the least educated) we 
                                                     
19
 It should be noted, that we ran several models without interaction effects to gain a general understanding of how 
individual traits are related with trust in general.  In sum, we found that on average, females, the unemployed and those 
that spoke a different mother-tongue from the majority had lower trust on average.  Income, age, education had positive 
relationships with trust, while urban respondents have lower trust than rural ones.  In terms of ideology, center and 
center-left displayed more trust than center-right or far left, with far right showing the lowest trust levels.   
20
 Before proceeding with hierarchical analysis, we ran an ‘empty’ model to test whether multi-level modeling was an 
appropriate design. We find that individual level variations in trust are significantly explained by differences in countries: 
by roughly 20%, which renders it clear that the individual level alone is not suitable for this analysis. 
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would expect that while all categories would increase as a function of QoG, the highest 
‘achievers’ (highly educated, income, employed, etc.) would display even higher trust. We 
also test whether QoG conditions political difference in social trust (e.g. self-ID ideology), 
and the extent to which trust is impacted by perceptions and experience with corruption is 
conditioned by QoG. 
According to our hypothesis, individuals in relatively well performing regions within cer-
tain countries will display higher levels of trust, and that variations driven by demographic 
differences among individuals who ‘trust others’ will be minimal, while in poorer perform-
ing regions, the levels of trust should be lower and more polarized along the lines of vari-
ous demographic groups.   
TABLE 2, PREDICTED PROBABILITIES (TRUST=1), WHOLE SAMPLE: INTERACTION EFFECTS WITH 
REGIONAL QOG  
 Variable   Low QoG   High QoG   
Baseline (no interaction) 0.40 
 
0.45 
 
      
Gender Female 0.35 
 
0.45 
 
 
Male 0.41 
 
0.44 
 
      
Age 18-29 0.34 
 
0.47 
 
 
30-44 0.41 
 
0.44 
 
 
45-64 0.42 
 
0.45 
 
 
65+ 0.44 
 
0.45 
 
      
Education below secondary 0.31 
 
0.37 
 
 
Secondary 0.37 
 
0.41 
 
 
univserity/college 0.45 
 
0.47 
 
 
post-grad 0.42 
 
0.60 
 
      
Income Low Income 0.38 
 
0.40 
 
 
Middle Income 0.41 
 
0.44 
 
 
High Income 0.43 
 
0.51 
 
      
Population Rural 0.39 
 
0.47 
 
 
10k-100k 0.41 
 
0.45 
 
 
100k-1m 0.42 
 
0.45 
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1m 0.40 
 
0.39 
 
      
Mother tongue 
 
0.41 
 
0.45 
 
Other language 
 
0.47 
 
0.39 
 
      
Political ID Don't know 0.35 
 
0.40 
 
 
Far Left 0.39 
 
0.44 
 
 
Center Left 0.41 
 
0.51 
 
 
Center  0.41 
 
0.45 
 
 
Center Right 0.41 
 
0.44 
 
 
Far Right 0.40 
 
0.34 
 
      Corruption Per-
ceptions  
Never 0.44 
 
0.57 
 
 
Frequent 0.27 
 
0.25 
 
      Corruption Expe-
rience 
No 0.40 
 
0.47 
 
 
Yes 0.41 
 
0.32 
 
      
Unemployed 
 
0.40 
 
0.40 
 
Employed*   0.41 
 
0.46 
 
Note: predicted probabilities of Trust=1 reported from logit regression with country fixed effects and clustering for regions.  In all 
models sample size is 71,001 for 189 regions.   Control variables include gdp p.c. (log), population density (log), and capital and 
autonomous regions. *Employed includes students and pensioners.   All models re-run with hierarchical logit (xtmelogit) and 
three levels, with differences being insignificant from those reported.   
 
For the sake of space, we report only the predicted probabilities of the individual interac-
tions setting regional QoG to low and high sample values21.  We find several noteworthy 
effects, consistent with our predictions.  First, when considering the differences in social 
trust for ‘personal’ demographic differences (age and gender) we find that the disparities 
among groups in their level of social trust widen as the level of QoG decreases. For exam-
ple, the difference in probability between females and males in ‘trusting others’ in low 
QoG settings is about 13%, while that gap all but disappears in high QoG contexts.  We 
find a similar dynamic with age, as the probability of a 65+ aged person is about a third 
more likely to ‘trust others’ than a respondent 18-29, while age differences are negligible in 
                                                     
21
 Predicted probabilities obtained by using the post regression command, ‘margins’.  Control variables include regional 
level GDP per capita (log), population density (log), capital region, autonomous region and controlling for random coun-
try effects, along with all individual level variables from Table 3.   Full results can be obtained by request to the authors. 
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high QoG regions (with young people actually trusting slightly more, yet the difference is 
negligible).    
In other cases we see gaps in TRUST widen as a function of QoG. For example, with 
both education and income; while there is a trust-gap between high and low educat-
ed/wage earning individuals in low QoG settings, the gap widens significantly in high 
QoG ones.  With regard to unemployment, there is a 7% gap between unemployed and 
employed respondents in high QoG regions, while no gap in low QoG regions.   In low 
QoG settings, there are essentially no differences in social trust between people living in 
rural area, towns, or large cities, while in high QoG regions, we find a clear ‘trust gap’ be-
tween urban and rural citizens  – with less populous regions more likely to ‘trust others’.  
Finally, non-native speakers become less trusting in high QoG areas, a result that warrants 
further research.   
As regards to political attitudes, we find two noteworthy results. One, political ideology 
does not determine differences in social trust in low QoG settings, yet we do find that all 
self-placed respondents are significantly higher than those that ‘did not know’ where they 
stood on the left-right scale. Yet, all groups are more trusting (including ‘don’t know’) as a 
function of QoG except for extreme right respondents, which actually trust less in high 
QoG settings compared with low QoG.  One explanation could be that high trust coun-
tries in this sample tend to be the most social democratic (e.g. Scandinavia and Nether-
lands) that have been dominated by center-left politics for several generations.  
Finally, we look at interactions between regional QoG and individual corruption percep-
tions and experiences and whether the respondent is unemployed or not for levels of so-
cial trust.  First, the results show that corruption perceptions and experiences play a highly 
significant role in predicting whether someone exhibits general social trust or not – and 
that both aspects (perceptions or experience) erode trust levels in high QoG context in 
particular.  In comparing two otherwise similar individual as regards to perceptions, we 
find that those who believe ‘others in their area never engage in corruption to obtain pub-
lic services’ to be more trusting of those who believe corruption occurs frequently irre-
spective of QoG.  Yet the gap widens significantly as a function of regional QoG (from 
0.17 to 0.32) – that is to say the individual level perception that corruption is rampant is 
‘stronger’ than the regional context.   
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With respect to corruption experiences (e.g. self-reported bribery), we find a very powerful 
interaction effect.  All things being equal, the probability of having social trust for an indi-
vidual with no direct corruption experience increases as a function of regional level QoG 
(from 0.40 to 0.47).  However, citizens that have paid a bribe in high QoG region are 
much less likely to exhibit social trust than even citizens who have first-hand experience 
with corruption in low QoG regions (from 0.47 to 0.32).  In low QoG regions moreover, 
we find a somewhat depressing result – there is no difference in the propensity for social 
trust between those that have direct experience with corruption and those that do not – 
both are only about 40% likely to ‘trust others’.  This shows how quickly corruption can 
diminish an individual’s trust even for those who live in a high QoG region.  Figures 2 and 
3 summarize several of our cross-level interaction results visually. 
Summary and concluding remarks 
In this study, we make two significant empirical contributions to the literature.  First, we 
test several of the main theoretical propositions on what explains variations in social trust 
using novel data collected by the authors, which sampled on the sub-national level in Eu-
ropean countries. With the aid of a newly collected regional dataset; the largest survey to 
date capturing levels of QoG and social trust, and with register and other data capturing 
the structural variables for the regions, we have tested our propositions empirically at both 
the regional and individual levels. We tested the theory of the relation between the quality 
of government (QoG) institutions and social trust against several other theoretical propo-
sitions (such as the effect of economic inequality, civic participation, ethnic diversity and 
political environment). Our central finding is that QoG is a highly robust predictor of ag-
gregate levels of social trust at the regional (sub-national) level, both within and across 
countries. That previous research has found support at the national level that low-corrupt, 
high QoG institutions are associated with higher levels of social trust across countries is 
therefore strengthened by these findings from the sub-national level. We would argue that 
the regional lens we have been able to use is an even better test of the theory since cultural 
and institutional differences that are difficult to capture in cross-country tests are ‘natural-
ly’ controlled for when comparing regions within countries. We also confirm results from 
several other studies showing that activity and membership in voluntary associations has 
negligible effects on the propensity for individuals to trust other people. More surprising is 
that the effects of social inequality and ethnic diversity on social trust are negligible when 
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controlling for the level QoG. Since these factors have been given much attention in pre-
vious research on social trust, our results thus call for further investigations.   
Secondly, we investigated cross-level interactions; namely whether differences in trust 
based on individual-level characteristics, experiences and attitudes are conditioned by the 
level of regional QoG.  Here the most general finding is that differences in social trust that 
can be attributed to ‘personal’ demographic differences (such as age and gender) become 
more pronounced at among individuals as the level of QoG in the region decreases. The 
implication is that with high levels of QoG, social cleavages that are based on such “per-
sonal” demographic factors should be easier to handle by various public policies, and vice 
versa in societies with high levels of QoG. A high level of QoG can therefore be seen as a 
requirement for handling suspicion about low trustworthiness between different social 
groups. Simply put, while the level of social trust between men and women and between 
young and old vary considerably in low QoG regions, the differences become insignif i-
cant.   
Our results give strong support to the individual-level theory launched by Rothstein & 
Eek (2008) that people that believe that there is a high level of corruption in society are 
likely  to mistrusting “other people in general”. They also confirm the parallel causal 
mechanism, namely that people who perceive public officials to be fair and honest also 
have a higher propensity for interpersonal trust (cf. Rothstein 2005). These results are 
quite strong: People that believe that “others in their area never engage in corruption to 
obtain public services” are twice as likely to trust others compared to those that believe 
that others engage in corruption frequently. Moreover, for high QoG regions, citizens 
who believe that corruption is a rare thing are almost three times as likely to trust others as 
those believing corruption is rampant in their region. In addition, our results show that 
social trust levels are equally low among people who think that corruption is a common 
practice, irrespective of regional QoG. As for experiences of corruption, our results show 
the existence of a very powerful interaction effect. The likelihood that an individual that 
has not experienced corruption ‘thinks other people can be trusted’ increases significantly, 
given that he or she lives in a high QoG region. A parallel finding is that citizens that have 
been engaged in corruption but who live in high QoG regions are much less likely to trust 
other people compared to citizens who have been paying bribes but who live in a low 
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QoG region.  For us, this is maybe the most convincing result for the corruption-social 
trust theory. 
For future research, we would like to underline that we are convinced of the many positive 
and socially valuable results that the social capital research agenda has produced. However, 
if our (and several others) results are correct, investing in a vibrant civic society is not the 
surest way of increasing social capital. This is an important lesson, not least for many in-
ternational aid organizations that have put support to voluntary associations high on their 
agenda, but also in a developed area of the world, Europe, where social trust varies im-
mensely and is surprisingly low on average. Instead, if we are correct, we need to increase 
our efforts in both defining what “quality of government” is, how to measure this and, 
most importantly, how it can be  
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